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BANKRUPTCY: EFFECT OF ACTS OF
INSOLVENT ON LIFE INSURANCE
EXEMPTION
THIS COMMENT focuses upon the effect in bankruptcy of acts of the
insolvent with respect to insurance on his life. Two principal questions
are considered: (I) In the case of insurance exempt under state law,
what are the consequences of a transfer or assignment of the policy, what
are the rights of creditors with respect to premiums paid by the insured
insolvent and what are the bankruptcy consequences of "loan" transac-
tions effected during insolvency3 and, (2) In the case of nonexempt
insurance, may the insolvent bring his insurance within the coverage of
applicable exemption statutes by change of beneficiary or relinquishment
of ownership rights. These questions often turn on interpretation of
state law, with an expected divergence in result. In this regard, it will
be seen that state laws governing exemptions have been superimposed
upon the operation of the bankruptcy scheme only with much difficulty.1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The rights of the trustee in bankruptcy with respect to an insurance
policy in force on the life of the bankrupt are determined as of the date
of the filing of the petition.2 Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
bankruptcy statute have established that only nonexempt insurance
having an obtainable cash surrender value at the time of bankruptcy
passes to the trustee, 3 and then only to the extent of that value.' Fur-
thermore, the bankrupt may redeem such insurance by paying over to
the trustee the outstanding cash surrender value.'
Exemption of life insurance proceeds is governed by state statute.
Normally, the trustee exercises no rights in insurance exempt under
state law.6 State exemption statutes vary greatly in coverage and are
'See, e.g., Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1475-82 (959).
24 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.23 (94z) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
'Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202 (.905).
'Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 4-59 (x913).
'Bankruptcy Act § 7oa(5), 44 Stat. 667 (1938), as amended, ii U.S.C. § iio
(1958). A policy may have a cash surrender value although none is provided for in
the contract of insurance. For example, the loan value may be taken. COLLIER § 70.23.
"Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 44 Stat. 667 (1938), as amended ii U.S.C. § iio
(1958).
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impossible of classification. In general, these statutes limit the exemp-
tion to policies payable to spouses, children, and dependents.8 Thus, in
most states, a policy payable to the estate of the insured is a general
asset subject to claims of creditors.' However, some statutes expressly
provide that even these policies are exempt.'0
In jurisdictions in which insurance payable to the insured's estate is
nonexempt, the trustee can obtain title to insurance payable to a third
party if the policy gives the insured the right unilaterally to change the
beneficiary. The trustee accomplishes this by exercising the insured's
right to change the beneficiary," making the policy payable to the in-
sured's estate. The insurance thus becomes an asset subject to creditors'
claims."
In summary, an insurance policy on the life of the bankrupt may be
brought into the estate in bankruptcy, subject to severe limitations. In
most jurisdictions, only policies payable to the insured's estate or policies
subject to unilateral change of beneficiary by the insured become assets
of the estate in bankruptcy. In many instances, however, the scope of
exemption statutes is not well defined. Problems concerning acts of the
insolvent insured with respect to his insurance are illustrative of the
present confusion and divergency in the law.
INSURANCE EXEMPT UNDER STATE LAW
Cases involving exempt insurance have presented the courts with
recurring questions. Does a transfer of insurance by an insolvent that
would otherwise be avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance affect the
exempt status of his insurance? May creditors of an insolvent insured
"See generally COLLIER § 6.165 25 VA. L. REV. 588, 589-90 (1939) ; 5 COUCH,
ON INSURANCE § 29:117 (2d ed. 196o) [hereinafter cited as CoucH 2d].
s COUCH ad § 29:124.
COUCH ad § 29:140 n.6.
10 These jurisdictions include Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See COUCH 2d § 29:140
n.75 I GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 182, 183 (rev. ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as GLENN].
"
1 Bankruptcy Act § 7oa(3), 64 Stat. 26 (195o), ii U.S.C. § ixoa(3) (1958).
12 See note 9 supra; COLLIER § 70.23 n.44. Of course, this procedure would bc
unavailing in the states listed in note io supra. Also, the trustee's recovery is limited
to the outstanding cash surrender value.
Several states have enacted legislation exempting insurance payable to spouses and
dependents, even though the insurance contract allows the insured to change the bene-
ficiary. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 6o, § 44 (1954)5 N.Y. INS. LAWS § 166. In other
jurisdictions the broad provisions of the subsisting statutes have been construed to uphold
the exemption. Jean v. Davis, 280 Fed. 706 (8th Cir. 1922); G. P. Farmer Coal &
Supply Co. v. Albright, 9o N.J. Eq. 122, 1o6 Atl. 545 (1919).
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recover premiums paid on exempt insurance during insolvency? What
are the bankruptcy consequences of "loan" transactions accomplished
during insolvency? These problems remain unsettled, largely because
of the multiplicity of applicable state law. Also, the courts do not agree
on the effect of Bankruptcy Act provisions in this area.
A. Fraudulent Conveyance of Exempt Property
As previously noted, the trustee in bankruptcy does not acquire title
to the bankrupt's exempt property. In addition, the fraudulent con-
veyances provision of the act expressly excludes exempt property.1 3
However, section 6, as amended by the Chandler Act,-4 provides that
the bankrupt may not claim an exemption in fraudulently transferred
property that is recovered by the trustee "under this Act for the benefit
of the estate."' 5 The decisions and the commentators disagree over the
effect of this statutory amendment on the life insurance exemption.
Collier states that "a fraudulent assignment or concealment of life in-
surance policies with a cash surrender value, if set aside, will destroy the
bankrupt's right to claim that such are exempt under § 6 and § 7oa." 6
Collier does not discuss the circumstances that will allow the trustee to set
aside such a transfer. Section 6, read literally, seems to give the trustee
rights that are expressly denied him in other sections of the act.' In
order to avoid such a result, section 6 has been construed" as complemen-
tary to section 7oe( i),'P which allows the trustee to avoid all transactions
"Bankruptcy Act § 67d(i) (a), as amended, 5z Stat. 875, '1 U.S.C. § Io 7 (d) (i)
(a) (.9s8).
14 52 Stat. 847 (1938)-
1§ § 6, Exemptions of Bankrupts. This Act shall not affect the allowance to bank-
rupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the
State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they
have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion, or for a longer portion of such sixth months than in any other State: Provided,
however, That no such allowance shall be made out of the property which a bankrupt
transferred or concealed and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under
this Act for the benefit of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by
way of security only and the property recovered is in excess of the amount secured
thereby, such allowance may be made out of such excess."
16 COLLIER § 70.z3.
1? Bankruptcy Act §§ 67d(i) (a), 7oa.
"In 68 YALE LJ. 1459, 1489 (1959), it is asserted that the § 6 proviso added by
the Chandler Act, together with § 7oe(i), only serves to provide a standard rule of
bankruptcy distribution in the few states where creditors may set aside conveyances of
exempt property.
1 Section 7oe(i) states: "A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a
debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which, under any Federal or' State law
applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason by any
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fraudulent under state law. The author of the 196o revision of Collier,
in interpreting section 6, seems to distinguish between property that
-may be the subject of an exemption and property that is "automatically"
exempt,2" concluding that the section 6 proviso applies only to the
former.
The decided cases do not clearly indicate the extent to which trans-
fers of exempt insurance may be attacked. For example, in two New
York cases, In re Ragozzino2' and In re Rogers,22 exemptions were
denied in situations in which the bankrupt transferred exempt insurance
to a third party, failing to schedule the policy as an exemption. In
neither case was the applicable New York statute mentioned.23 In
Ragozzino, the federal district court denied the exemption because the
insured bankrupt "sought to apply the cash surrender value to his per-
sonal advantage. 2 4  In the Rogers decision, the court, after discussing
the Chandler Act amendment, held that the bankrupt lost his exemption
because he failed to schedule the transferred policy as an exempt 
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the insured's wife was assigned to a creditor and reassigned to the wife.
Creditors of the insured contended that the policy had lost its exempt
status. The applicable South Carolina fraudulent conveyance statute
made every conveyance with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud void as
to creditors affected thereby. The court, however, construing this statute
in connection with the state exemption statute, held the proceeds exempt.
Cases applying the section 6 proviso to homestead exemptions are
equally inconsistent. In Gardner v. Johnson,28 the court utilized a
waiver theory in holding that a fraudulently conveyed homestead was
not exempt from creditors' claims. Moreover, the court allowed the
trustee to go directly against the grantee to recover the property. In a
case involving similar facts, the Michigan Supreme Court, declaring that
the homestead exemption is an absolute right, held that the fraudulently
conveyed property of the debtor could not be subjected to creditors'
claims. 29 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held
that although a transfer of a homestead to a creditor in payment of an
antecedent debt contained all the elements of a voidable preference
under section 6oa(i) of the Bankruptcy Act the trustee could not re-
cover the property from the transferee because the property in question
was exempt under Oklahoma lawY0 The dissent, asserting that this
decision is contrary to the rule that the status and rights of bankrupt's
creditors are determined as of the filing of the petition, maintained that
the exemption is personal to the bankrupt and should not be allowed to
a transferee.3'
The failure of courts to agree on the extent to which exemptions will
be honored may reflect a more basic conflict of opinion over the social
purposes of bankruptcy. The section 6 proviso should b effectuated to
the extent that the bankrupt is not allowed to claim an exemption in
recovered property if such property is not "absolutely" exempt but is
one of several articles out of which the bankrupt is entitled to choose
his exemptions. For example, if the applicable state statute exempts
one automobile and the debtor owns two automobiles, the most valuable
of which he fraudulently conveys to his neighbor, he should not be
allowed to reap the benefit of the trustee's endeavors by substituting in
28 195 F.zd 717 ( 9th Cir. 1952), reversing In re Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.
Cal. 951).
2'9 Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 59 N.W.zd 41 (-953) (quoting 6 AM. JuR.
Bankruptcy §§ '111-13). Compare Branchfield v. McCulley, 231 P.zd 771 (Ore.
1951).
"Rutledge v. Johansen, 270 F.zd 881 (oth Cir. 1959).
a' Id. at 883.
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his exemption schedule the recovered auto for the less valuable one.
The applicability of section 6 to this situation is unquestioned.
In the case of property that is "absolutely" exempt, however, appli-
cability of the proviso is not so certain. A strong argument can be made
for not imposing restrictions on the debtor's right to transfer exempt
property, and the frequently enunciated rule that exemption statutes
should be liberally construed3 2 supports such a position. On the other
hand, those who contend that exemptions are not a right but are "acts
of legislative grace" require strict adherence to the statutory require-
ments.33 Courts espousing this position seem to maintain an attitude of
"caveat debtor." Other courts engage in judicial obscuration by assert-
ing that the debtor who fraudulently conveys exempt property "waives"
his right of exemption. 4 The real question is: Does the debtor have a
right to "fraudulently" convey property that is inherently exempt?
B. Premium Payments Made During Insolvency
The development of rules governing premium payments during
insolvency lucidly portrays the increased attention paid to the social
consequences of bankruptcy. If life insurance is to be accorded a pre-
ferred position within the bankruptcy scheme, the insolvent must be
allowed to continue to pay premiums in order to keep in force his highly-
regarded insurance protection. However, creditors' rights should not
be disregarded in the process. Judicial attempts to balance these con-
flicting equities have produced divergent results. Early decisions held
that payment of premiums during insolvency made out a prima facie
case of fraud.s5 As late as 194o, the weight of authority, absent statu-
tory provision, considered premiums paid while insolvent as fraudulent
and allowed creditors to recover those premiums from the proceeds of
the policy.36  However, there has long existed contrary opinion. In
1888, the Supreme Court, in Central Bank of Washington v. Hume,"7
ruled that absent specific circumstances showing fraudulent intent the
payment of premiums by an insolvent in order to keep in force insurance
payable to his wife and children was not fraudulent. The obvious policy
underlying this position is that a debtor, although insolvent, should be
" E.g., Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F.2d 814 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 293 U.S. 56S
(1934). See generally COUCH 2d § 29:117.
" Cf. Holden v. Stratton, x98 U.S. 202 (1905).
"E.g., Gardner v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 717 ( 9 th Cir. x95z).
85 E.g., In re Goodchild, so F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
"'GLENN § 177a (citing cases).
S 12S U.S. 195 (1888).
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permitted, even encouraged, to insure his life in a reasonable amount
to protect his family. This is the majority view today."
The "reasonable" amount of insurance that can be maintained during
insolvency varies from state to state. Some statutes simply state that
premiums paid in fraud of creditors are recoverable with interest; other
jurisdictions specifically limit the amount of insurance that may be main-
tained or place a ceiling on allowable premium payments. 9 While
neither criterion is free from problems, the former "premiums paid in
fraud" standard is preferable to the latter inflexible "rule of thumb."
A few courts have disallowed relief to creditors despite a showing of
actual fraudulent intent; 40 others support the contention that premiums
paid during insolvency are fraudulent in law, even though the insurance
is made exempt by statute.
4 1
Even in those jurisdictions requiring proof of fraudulent intent, the
quantum of proof necessary varies substantially. Generally, it must be
shown that the debtor actually intended to defraud the complaining
creditors.4 2  The procuring of an unreasonably large amount of insur-
ance during the period prior to bankruptcy, however, has been held to
be evidence of constructive fraud.3 In contrast, one court held that a
creditor seeking relief must prove fraud in the inception of the contract
and must show that the beneficiary and the insurance carrier were parties
to the fraud 
44
Assuming that the trustee can prove fraudulent intent, what reme-
dies are available to him? The problems presented by an attempt to
superimpose a state-created remedy designed to effectuate state law upon
an entirely different federal concept are exemplified here. While at
least one jurisdiction has disallowed the exemption where the premiums
were fraudulently paid,45 most states allow defrauded creditors to re-
cover premium payments, with interest, out of the proceeds of the
insurance. There is no problem here if the policy matures before or
during administration of the estate in bankruptcy. However, in all
'
8 COUCH 2d § 29:145 n. S.
'
9 VANCE, INSURANCE 745 nn.16-19 (2d ed. 1930).
"E.g., Greiman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 823 ( 3 d Cir.), cert. denied
305 U.S. 6o6 (938) ; In re Silansky 21 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
" CoucH 2d § 29:146 n.2. The cases cited by Couch are older decisions of question-
able authority today.
'
2 COUCH zd § 29:148.
'
3 E.g., In re Newberger, a F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Okla. 1932).
"San Jacinto Bldg., Inc. v. Brown, 79 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
'
5 Lazarus v. Alphin, x8 Ark. 267, 46 S.W.2d 11o4 (932).
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other situations the trustee is in the position of having a remediless
right, since the term "proceeds" almost universally has been held to
include only proceeds payable at maturity.46
Here, again, conflicting equities must be balanced. The bankrupt
should not be required to surrender his insurance protection in order to
satisfy claims that may be insubstantial when compared with the value
of the protection that would be lost.4 7  On the other hand, the trustee
should be allowed to secure all assets that are available under law. Yet,
he cannot postpone administration of the estate in bankruptcy until the
death of the insured bankrupt. Indeed, such a course of action would
defeat an important function of bankruptcy.
Neither of these unsatisfactory solutions is necessitated. The bank-
rupt should be given a choice, similar to that allowed under section
7oa(5). In this instance, he would be allowed to "borrow" enough on
the exempt insurance to satisfy the trustee's claim based on fraudulent
premium payments. If the bankrupt's equity in the policy has been
exhausted, then, under the reasoning of Burlingham v. Crouse,48 the
claim based on the insurance should be extinguished. The proposed rule
could be enacted by Congress, thereby assuring uniform application
in bankruptcy.
C. "Loan" Transactions Effected During Insolvency
H takes out insurance on his life making W the beneficiary. The
proceeds are exempt under applicable state law. Subsequently, while
insolvent, H "borrows" $io,ooo on the policy. Are the proceeds of this
transaction exempt from the bankrupt estate?
In considering this question, it must be kept in mind that a "loan" on
"This seems to be well-settled. In Greiman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96
F.zd 823 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 305 U.S. 6o6 (1938), the Court of Appeals, following
New Jersey law, held that the trustee could not recover fraudulently paid premiums
out of cash surrender value, the court intimating that this policy provides a haven for
fraud. In Doethlaff v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.);
cert. denied 33 U.S. 579 (i94x), the trustee got one step further, having obtained an
order of the district court requiring the insurance company to refund premiums paid
during insolvency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "proceeds" did not
include cash surrender value. Contra, In re Goodchild, 1o F. Supp. 491 (E.D.N.Y.
1935) (decided under superseded New York statute). See generally COUCH 2d §§ 29:
149-51.
"7 This would be especially true during the early years of a policy's life or if the
insolvent were no longer insurable.
A8 228 U.S. 459 (1x93)- In Burlingham, the Supreme Court held that the trustee's




a life insurance policy does not result in the normal debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. Rather, the amount of the loan represents a part of the in-
sured's equity in the policy and is, in reality, an advancement. The in-
sured borrower is not obligated to repay the amount advanced. Indeed,
most life insurance "qoans" are never repaid.
Glenn, answering the above hypothetical in the negative, asserts that
the proceeds of a loan are not exempt.49  However, at least one case is
contra. In re Basak0 is a classic illustration of the difficulty that courts
often encounter in attempting to correlate the many facets of insurance
law with bankruptcy. In this case the bankrupt "borrowed" $45,000 on
an exempt life insurance policy. The trustee petitioned the referee for
an order directing the bankrupt to turn over the $45,000 and the policies
in question. The referee dismissed the petition, and the district court
affirmed. The court, relying on precedent involving trustees' actions
to secure the cash surrender value of exempt policies,51 held that the
applicable Pensylvania statute exempted loan proceeds in the hands of
the bankrupt. The statute speaks in terms of "net amount payable. 53
Obviously, the exemption of the proceeds of the insurance at maturity
should have been honored. But, why should the bankrupt be allowed
to circumvent the policy behind bankruptcy by exempt "borrowing" on
exempt insurance? Patently, such a result encourages conduct that tends
to defeat the purpose of the insurance exemption-to provide for the
family of the bankrupt after his death. Decisions like Basak vividly
point up the need for careful, detailed, uniform codification of exemp-
tion law."t
"GLENN § ISO.
IS iz F. Supp. z78 (M.D. Pa. 1935).
" The court relied on In re Phillips, 7 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1934), stating: "A
similar question, if not the same question was before this court in Re Phillips . . . 2
iz F. Supp. at 279. It is true that both cases involved the question of whether insurance
proceeds payable to a trustee in trust for insured's wife and children were exempt.
However, Phillips did not present the question of exemption of loan proceeds paid to
the bankrupt insured.
r2PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 517 (1954). "The net amount payable under any
policy of life insurance or under any annuity contract upon the life of any person,
heretofore or hereafter made for the benefit of or assigned to the wife or children or
dependent relatives of such person, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors of such
person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after the passage of this act,
whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary is reserved by or permitted to
such person."
"Note 46 supra.
"A recent New York decision, Tanges v. Schonbrun, 196 N.Y.S.zd 381 (Sup. Ct.
1959), held that under New York law (N.Y. INs. LAws § 166) loan proceeds in the
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Most of the cases dealing with "loan" transactions have involved
the repayment during insolvency of a prior loan.55 As in cases involving
premiums paid during insolvency, assets used to repay a loan on exempt
insurance are recoverable by the trustee only if fraudulent intent of the
debtor in repaying the loan is proven. Several New York cases provide
a convenient vehicle for tracing the development of this rule. In In re
Hirsh,56 the federal district court held that repayment of "loans" and
payment of advance premiums during insolvency and shortly before
bankruptcy proceedings were begun was presumptively fraudulent and
barred confirmation of a composition plan. The question of recovery
of the loan proceeds was not before the court. In re Yaeger17 involved
a similar factual situation; however, the court held that the bankrupt's
repayment of the "loan" did not allow the trustee to secure the policy as
an asset of the estate in bankruptcy. Both of these cases were decided
under the prior New York exemption statute.58
In Schwartz v. Seldon,59 decided under subsisting New York law, 0
the court held that the bankrupt's repayment of a loan on exempt in-
surance could not be attacked in the absence of evidence of actual intent
to defraud.0' The court disallowed the trustee's claim to the cash sur-
render value of the policy. 2
Assuming the requisite fraudulent intent can be proven, should such
a determination destroy the bankrupt's exemption? Keeping in mind
that the avowed purpose of the life insurance exemption is to protect
deserving beneficiaries, it would seem that every effort should be made
to keep the protection intact. Viewed in this light, it becomes apparent
hands of the debtor were not protected. The court fined the bankrupt for contempt
for failing to turn over the proceeds of the loan.
" To the extent that loan proceeds are nonexempt, these cases are similar to those
discussed infra in which nonexempt assets are converted into exempt status on the eve on
bankruptcy.
564 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
57z F. Supp. 324. (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
58 N.Y. INS. LAWS § 55a.
o i53 F.zd 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
0 N.Y. INS. LAWS § 166(d).
"1 On another exempt policy, the bankrupt bad obtained $675.66 from the insurance
company in consideration of a reduction in the face value of the policy from $io,ooo to
$5,ooo. He applied this money to repayment of the loan in the other policy. The
court upheld the transaction, stating that "no actual intent to defraud can be found
from the mere transferring from one exempt fund to another exempt fund." 153 F.2d
at 337.
62 Zccord, In re Silansky, 21 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (repayment of loan on
exempt policy with nonexempt money valid in absence of "extrinsic fraud").
[Vol. i96i: 569
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that the ability of the insured to exhaust this protection is inconsistent
with the theory of the exemption. Perhaps the Bankruptcy Act should
be amended to disallow exemption of insurance on which the bankrupt
has the right unilaterally to borrow. Of course, he can be denied dis-
charge under the present law,63 but this does not satisfy creditors' imme-
diate rights. If the exemption were denied where the bankrupt has such
a right, the beneficiary, not the bankrupt, would be prejudiced. How-
ever, the bankrupt could redeem the policy under section 70a(5) of
the act.
In the situation in which the bankrupt repays a loan on exempt in-
surance in fraud of creditors, perhaps the trustee should be allowed to
recover the payment out of the bankrupt's person~al exemptions. Such
a result, however, would require a delicate balancing of conflicting equi-
ties. Since there would be no problem if the loan situation were not
allowed, the suggested federal denial of the exemption seemingly would
be an equitable solution; although, implementation of such a provision
would be difficult.64
CONVERSION OF NONEXEMPT INSURANCE DURING INSOLVENCY
Changes in judicial and legislative attitude toward acts of insolvents
in converting nonexempt assets into exempt status reflect a more general
change of philosophy with regard to exemptions. The older decisions
held that a conversion of this type by an insolvent was "clearly a fraudu-
lent conveyance. '65 Other cases have held that such a transaction is
presumptively fraudulent. 6  Today, under the general rule, a change
of beneficiary which has the effect of bringing the policy within the
statutory exemption cannot be attacked as fraudulent, even though the
insured was insolvent at the time.67 This is subject to the qualification
that proof of actual fraud of creditors will allow relief. The cases do
"Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), 5z Stat 850 (938), 11 U.S.C. § 32c(4) (1958).
" Obviously, life insurance contracts are not usually written in contemplation of
bankruptcy. Rather, the flexible policy which allows the insured to draw on his invest-
ment during his lifetime is much more acceptable to the prospective applicant. It is
doubtful whether a policy with no loan provision would be acceptable to the trade or
to the insured, unless, of course, the policy is written in contemplation of bankruptcy.
" E.g., Aetna Nat'l Bank v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 24 Fed. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
See generally GLENN § 177 n.75.
"E.g., Catchings v. Manlove, 39 Miss. 655, 668 (1861) ("not necessary .. . to
aver that the conveyance or assignment was made with a fraudulent intent.")
e7COUCH 2d § 29:145.
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not dearly indicate the quantum of proof necessary 68 again, state law
comes into play.
The effect of acquisition of exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy
has also been presented in hearings on discharge. In In re Feynman,"
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order of the
district court denying a discharge on the ground that the bankrupt had
fraudulently transferred an insurance policy to his wife one month prior
to filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Judge Learned Hand,
speaking for the court, stated: "Even though ... the policy had no sur-
render value, the result is the same, for at that time ... the bankrupt
could not have reclaimed it under section 7oa(5) .'" In another dis-
charge proceeding, 71 however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the district court erred in denying a discharge on the
ground that the bankrupt had traded non-exempt cattle for exempt hogs
while insolvent and within four months of voluntary bankruptcy. The
court held that the fact of the transfer alone was not sufficiently indica-
tive of a fraudulent purpose on the part of the bankrupt.72
Judicial difference of opinion on the question of pre-bankruptcy
conversions possibly reflects a more basic conflict over the status of
exemptions in bankruptcy law. If exemptions are considered to be
absolute rights, then it should make no difference when or in what
manner the bankrupt's property is made exempt. If, on the other hand,
exemptions are "acts of legislative grace" and the bankrupt must have
equity's scrubbed hands before he can avail himself of the state's benevo-
lence, then the courts should scrutinize carefully the conduct of the
debtor before bankruptcy. In the light of reality and expediency, it is
believed that exemptions should be absolute-and absolutely reasonable.
A corollary is that they be uniform.7" In the case of life insurance,
congressional reform is especially needed. Life insurance exemptions
reflect sound public policy and should be given effect. However, state
exemption statutes governing insurance have "grow'd" like Topsy, with
68 In La Borde v. Farmers State Bank, ix6 Neb. 33, 2z5 N.W. 559 (1927), the
court held that the Nebraska statute did not exempt insurance in which debtor made his
wife beneficiary two days before his death and in contemplation thereof. In Kirkpatrick
v. Johnson, 197 Fed. 235 (S.E.D. Pa. x9z2), the court held that a voluntary assign-
ment by an insolvent was presumed to be fraudulent as against the trustee and allowed
the trustee to recover the cash surrender value of the policy.
69 77 F.2d 320 (zd Cir. 1935).
"Old. at 322.
"Forsberg v. Security State Bank, iS F.zd 499 (8th Cir. 19z6).
"Id,. at Soz.
"See generally Comment, 68 YALE L.J. x459, 1514 (1959).
[Vol. 1961: 569
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little rhyme or reason, especially when applied-or misapplied-to bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Congress has the power to promulgate a national
schedule of insurance exemptions. 74 Enactment of such legislation
would greatly clarify this confused area of bankruptcy law.
7' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
